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Abstract
We consider the problem of answering queries about formulas of propositional logic based
on background knowledge partially represented explicitly as other formulas, and partially repre-
sented as partially obscured examples independently drawn from a fixed probability distribution,
where the queries are answered with respect to a weaker semantics than usual – PAC-Semantics,
introduced by Valiant [51] – that is defined using the distribution of examples. We describe a
fairly general, efficient reduction to limited versions of the decision problem for a proof system
(e.g., bounded space treelike resolution, bounded degree polynomial calculus, etc.) from cor-
responding versions of the reasoning problem where some of the background knowledge is not
explicitly given as formulas, only learnable from the examples. Crucially, we do not generate an
explicit representation of the knowledge extracted from the examples, and so the “learning” of
the background knowledge is only done implicitly. As a consequence, this approach can utilize
formulas as background knowledge that are not perfectly valid over the distribution—essentially
the analogue of agnostic learning here.
∗Supported by ONR grant number N000141210358 and NSF Grant CCF-0939370.
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1 Introduction
PAC-Semantics was introduced by Valiant [51] in an attempt to unify statistical and logical ap-
proaches to reasoning: on the one hand, given background knowledge represented as a collection of
axioms, one may perform logical deduction, and on the other hand, given background knowledge
represented as a collection of examples, one can derive a statistical conclusion by testing whether
the conclusion is supported by a sufficiently large fraction of the examples. PAC-Semantics captures
both sources. As is typical for such works, we can illustrate the utility of such a combined approach
with a story about an aviary. Suppose that we know that the birds of the aviary fly unless they
are penguins, and that penguins eat fish. Now, suppose that we visit the aviary at feeding time,
and notice that most (but perhaps not all) of the birds in the aviary seem not to eat fish. From
this information, we can infer that most of the birds in the aviary can fly. This conclusion draws
on both the empirical (partial) information and reasoning from our explicit, factual knowledge: on
the one hand, our empirical observations did not mention anything about whether or not the birds
of the aviary could fly, and on the other hand, although our knowledge is sufficient to conclude that
the birds that don’t eat fish can fly, it isn’t sufficient to conclude whether or not, broadly speaking,
the birds in the aviary can fly.
Valiant’s original work described an application of PAC-Semantics to the task of predicting the
values of unknown attributes in new examples based on the values of some known attributes of the
example—for example, filling in a missing word in an example sentence [41]. In this work, by con-
trast, we introduce and describe how to solve a (limited) decision task for PAC-Semantics, deciding
whether or not a given “query” formula follows from the background knowledge, represented by
both a collection of axiom formulas and a collection of examples. In particular, we use a model of
partial information due to Michael [40] to capture and cope with reasoning from partially obscured
examples from a target distribution.
What we show is roughly that as long as we can efficiently use small proofs to certify validity
in the classical sense and the rules of inference in the proof system are preserved under restric-
tions, we can efficiently certify the validity (under PAC-Semantics) of a query from a sample of
partial assignments whenever it follows from some formula(s) that could be verified to hold under
the partial assignments. Thus, in such a case, the introduction of probability to the semantics
in this limited way (to cope with the imperfection of learned rules) actually does not harm the
tractability of inference. Moreover, the “learning” is actually also quite efficient, and imposes no
restrictions on the representation class beyond the assumption that their values are observed under
the partial assignments and the restrictions imposed by the proof system itself. In Section 4, we
will then observe that almost every special case of a propositional proof system with an efficient
decision algorithm considered in the literature satisfies these conditions, establishing the breadth
of applicability of the approach.
It is perhaps more remarkable in from a learning theoretic perspective that our approach does
not require the rules to be learned (or discovered) to be completely consistent with the examples
drawn from the (arbitrary) distribution. In the usual learning context, this would be referred to
as agnostic learning, as introduced by Kearns et al. [28]. Agnostic learning is notoriously hard—
Kearns et al. noted that agnostic learning of conjunctions (over an arbitrary distribution, in the
standard PAC-learning sense) would yield an efficient algorithm for PAC-learning DNF (also over
arbitrary distributions), which remains the central open problem of computational learning theory.
Again, by declining to produce a hypothesis, we manage to circumvent a barrier (to the state of the
art, at least). Such rules of less-than-perfect validity seem to be very useful from the perspective of
2
AI: for example, logical encodings of planning problems typically use “frame axioms” that assert
that nothing changes unless it is the effect of an action. In a real world setting, these axioms are
not strictly true, but such rules still provide a useful approximation. It is therefore desirable that
we can learn to utilize them. We discuss this further in Section 5.
Relationship to other work Given that the task we consider is fundamental and has a variety
of applications, other approaches have naturally been proposed—for example, Markov Logic [47]
is one well-known approach based on graphical models, and Bayesian Logic Programming [29] is
an approach that has grown out of the Inductive Logic Programming (ILP) community that can
address the kinds of tasks we consider here. The main distinction between all of these approaches
and our approach is that these other approaches all aim to model the distribution of the data, which
is generally a much more demanding task – both in terms of the amount of data and computation
time required – than simply answering a query. Naturally, the upshot of these other works is
that they are much more versatile, and there are a variety of other tasks (e.g., density estimation,
maximum likelihood computations) that these frameworks can handle that we do not. Our aim is
instead to show how this more limited (but still useful) task can be done much more efficiently,
much like how algorithms such as SVMs and boosting can succeed at predicting attributes without
needing to model the distribution of the data.
In this respect, our work is similar to the Learning to Reason framework of Khardon and
Roth [30], who showed how an NP-hard reasoning task (deciding a log n-CNF query), when coupled
with a learning task beyond the reach of the state of the art (learning DNF from random examples)
could result in an efficient overall system. The distinction between our work and Khardon and
Roth’s is, broadly speaking, that we re-introduce the theorem-proving aspect that Khardon and
Roth had explicitly sought to avoid. Briefly, these techniques permit us to incorporate declaratively
specified background knowledge and moreover, permit us to cope with partial information in more
general cases than Khardon and Roth [31], who could only handle constant width clauses. Another
difference between our work and that of Khardon and Roth, that also distinguishes our work from
traditional ILP (e.g., [42]), is that as mentioned above, we are able to utilize rules that hold with
less than perfect probability (akin to agnostic learning, but easier to achieve here).
2 Definitions and preliminaries
PAC-Semantics Inductive generalization (as opposed to deduction) inherently entails the pos-
sibility of making mistakes. Thus, the kind of rules produced by learning algorithms cannot hope
to be valid in the traditional (Tarskian) sense (for reasons we describe momentarily), but intu-
itively they do capture some useful quality. PAC-Semantics were thus introduced by Valiant [51]
to capture the quality possessed by the output of PAC-learning algorithms when formulated in a
logic. Precisely, suppose that we observe examples independently drawn from a distribution over
{0, 1}n; now, suppose that our algorithm has found a rule f(x) for predicting some target attribute
xt from the other attributes. The formula “xt = f(x)” may not be valid in the traditional sense, as
PAC-learning does not guarantee that the rule holds for every possible binding, only that the rule
f so produced agrees with xt with probability 1 − ǫ with respect to future examples drawn from
the same distribution. That is, the formula is instead “valid” in the following sense:
Definition 1 ((1− ǫ)-valid) Given a distribution D over {0, 1}n, we say that a Boolean function
R is (1− ǫ)-valid if Prx∈D[R(x) = 1] ≥ 1− ǫ. If ǫ = 0, we say R is perfectly valid.
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Of course, we may consider (1 − ǫ)-validity of relations R that are not obtained by learning
algorithms and in particular, not of the form “xt = f(x).”
Classical inference in PAC-Semantics. Valiant [51] considered one rule of inference, chaining,
for formulas of the form ℓt = f(x) where f is a linear threshold function: given a collection of literals
such that the partial assignment obtained from satisfying those literals guarantees f evaluates to
true, infer the literal ℓt. Valiant observed that for such learned formulas, the conjunction of literals
derived from a sequence of applications of chaining is also 1− ǫ′-valid for some polynomially larger
ǫ′. It turns out that this property of soundness under PAC-Semantics is not a special feature of
chaining: generally, it follows from the union bound that any classically sound derivation is also
sound under PAC-Semantics in a similar sense.
Proposition 2 (Classical reasoning is usable in PAC-Semantics) Let ψ1, . . . , ψk be formu-
las such that each ψi is (1− ǫi)-valid under a common distribution D for some ǫi ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose
that {ψ1, . . . , ψk} |= ϕ (in the classical sense). Then ϕ is 1− ǫ
′-valid under D for ǫ′ =
∑
i ǫi.
So, soundness under PAC-Semantics does not pose any constraints on the rules of inference that
we might consider; the degree of validity of the conclusions merely aggregates any imperfections in
the various individual premises involved. We also note that without further knowledge of D, the
loss of validity from the use of a union bound is optimal.
Proposition 3 (Optimality of the union bound for classical reasoning) Let ψ1, . . . , ψk be
a collection of formulas such that there exists some distribution D on which each ψi is 1− ǫi-valid,
for which {ψ1, . . . , ψi−1, ψi+1, . . . , ψk} 6|= ψi, and
∑
i ǫi < 1. Then there exists a distribution D
′ for
which each ψi is 1− ǫi-valid, but ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψk is not 1−
∑
i ǫi + δ valid for any δ > 0.





i ǫi > 0, there must be a (satisfying) assignment x
(0) for ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψk. On the other hand,
as each ψi is not entailed by the others, there must be some assignment x
(i) that satisfies the
others but falsifies ψi. We now construct D




i ǫi on x
(0). It is easy to verify that D′ satisfies the claimed conditions.
Subsequently, we will assume that our Boolean functions will be given by formulas of proposi-
tional logic formed over Boolean variables {x1, . . . , xn} by negation and the following linear thresh-
old connectives (which we will refer to as the threshold basis for propositional formulas):
Definition 4 (Threshold connective) A threshold connective for a list of k formulas φ1, . . . , φk
is given by a list of k + 1 real numbers, c1, . . . , ck, b. The formula [
∑k
i=1 ciφi ≥ b] is interpreted as




Naturally, a threshold connective expresses a k-ary AND connective by taking the ci = 1, and
b = k, and expresses a k-ary OR by taking c1, . . . , ck, b = 1.
We note that Valiant actually defines PAC-Semantics for first-order logic by considering D to
be a distribution over the values of atomic formulas. He focuses on formulas of bounded arity
over a polynomial size domain; then evaluating such formulas from the (polynomial size) list of
values of all atomic formulas is tractable, and in such a case everything we consider here about
propositional logic essentially carries over in the usual way, by considering each atomic formula
to be a propositional variable (and rewriting the quantifiers as disjunctions or conjunctions over
all bindings). As we don’t have any insights particular to first-order logic to offer, we will focus
exclusively on the propositional case in this work.
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Partial observability Our knowledge of a distribution D will be provided in the form of a
collection of examples independently drawn from D, and our main question of interest will be
deciding whether or not a formula is (1 − ǫ)-valid. Of course, reasoning in PAC-Semantics from
(complete) examples is trivial: Hoeffding’s inequality guarantees that with high probability, the
proportion of times that the query formula evaluates to ‘true’ is a good estimate of the degree of
validity of the formula. By contrast, if the distribution D is not known, then we can’t guarantee
that a formula is (1− ǫ)-valid for any ǫ < 1 without examples without deciding whether the query
is a tautology. So, it is only interesting to consider what happens “in between.” To capture such
“in between” situations, we will build on the theory of learning from partial observations developed
by Michael [40].
Definition 5 (Partial assignments) A partial assignment ρ is an element of {0, 1, ∗}n. We say
that a partial assignment ρ is consistent with an assignment x ∈ {0, 1}n if whenever ρi 6= ∗, ρi = xi.
Naturally, instead of examples from D, our knowledge of D will be provided in the form of a
collection of example partial assignments drawn from a masking process over D:
Definition 6 (Masking process) A mask is a function m : {0, 1}n → {0, 1, ∗}n, with the prop-
erty that for any x ∈ {0, 1}n, m(x) is consistent with x. A masking process M is a mask-valued
random variable (i.e., a random function). We denote the distribution over partial assignments
obtained by applying a masking process M to a distribution D over assignments by M(D).
Note that the definition of masking processes allows the hiding of entries to depend on the
underlying example from D. Of course, since we know that when all entries are hidden by a
masking process the problem we consider will become NP-hard, we must restrict our attention
to settings where it is possible to learn something about D. In pursuit of this, we will consider
formulas that can be evaluated in the straightforward way from the partial assignments with high
probability—such formulas are one kind which we can certainly say that we know to be (essentially)
true under D.
Definition 7 (Witnessed formulas) We define a formula to be witnessed to evaluate to true or
false in a partial assignment by induction on its construction; we say that the formula is witnessed
iff it is witnessed to evaluate to either true or false.
• A variable is witnessed to be true or false iff it is respectively true or false in the partial
assignment.
• ¬φ is witnessed to evaluate to true iff φ is witnessed to evaluate to false; naturally, ¬φ is
witnessed to evaluate to false iff φ is witnessed to evaluate to true.












max{0, ci} < b. (i.e., iff the truth or falsehood,
respectively, of the inequality is determined by the witnessed formulas, regardless of what
values are substituted for the non-witnessed formulas.)
An example of particular interest is a CNF formula. A CNF is witnessed to evaluate to true in
a partial assignment precisely when every clause has some literal that is satisfied. It is witnessed
to evaluate to false precisely when there is some clause in which every literal is falsified.
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Refining the motivating initial discussion somewhat, a witnessed formula is one that can be
evaluated in a very local manner. When the formula is not witnessed, we will likewise be interested
in the following “simplification” of the formula obtained from an incomplete evaluation:
Definition 8 (Restricted formula) Given a partial assignment ρ and a formula φ, the restric-
tion of φ under ρ, denoted φ|ρ, is recursively defined as follows:
• If φ is witnessed in ρ, then φ|ρ is the formula representing the value that φ is witnessed to
evaluate to under ρ.
• If φ is a variable not set by ρ, φ|ρ = φ.
• If φ = ¬ψ and φ is not witnessed in ρ, then φ|ρ = ¬(ψ|ρ).
• If φ = [
∑k
i=1 ciψi ≥ b] and φ is not witnessed in ρ, suppose that ψ1, . . . , ψℓ are witnessed
in ρ (and ψℓ+1, . . . , ψk are not witnessed). Then φ|ρ is [
∑k





For a restriction ρ and set of formulas F , we let F |ρ denote the set {φ|ρ : φ ∈ F}.
Proof systems. We will need a formalization of a “proof system” in order to state our theorems:
Definition 9 (Proof system) A proof system is given by a sequence of relations {Ri}
∞
i=0 over
formulas such that Ri is of arity-(i+1) and whenever Ri(ψj1 , . . . , ψji , ϕ) holds, {ψj1 , . . . , ψji} |= ϕ.
Any formula ϕ satisfying R0 is said to be an axiom of the proof system. A proof of a formula φ
from a set of hypotheses H in the proof system is given by a finite sequence of triples consisting of
1. A formula ψk
2. A relation Ri of the proof system or the set H
3. A subsequence of formulas ψj1 , . . . , ψji with jℓ < k for ℓ = 1, . . . , i (i.e., from the first compo-
nents of earlier triples in the sequence) such that Ri(ψj1 , . . . , ψji , ψk) holds, unless ψk ∈ H.
for which φ is the first component of the final triple in the sequence.
Needless to say it is generally expected that Ri is somehow efficiently computable, so that the
proofs can be checked. We don’t explicitly impose such a constraint on the formal object for the
sake of simplicity, but the reader should be aware that these expectations will be fulfilled in all
cases of interest.
We will be interested in the effect of the restriction (partial evaluation) mapping applied to
proofs—that is, the “projection” of a proof in the original logic down to a proof over the smaller
set of variables by the application of the restriction to every step in the proof. Although it may be
shown that this at least preserves the (classical) semantic soundness of the steps, this falls short
of what we require: we need to know that the rules of inference are preserved under restrictions.
Since the relations defining the proof system are arbitrary, though, this property must be explicitly
verified. Formally, then:
Definition 10 (Restriction-closed proof system) We will say that a proof system over propo-
sitional formulas is restriction closed if for every proof of the proof system and every partial as-
signment ρ, for any (satisfactory) step of the proof Rk(ψ1, . . . , ψk, φ), there is some j ≤ k such that
for the subsequence ψi1 , . . . , ψij Rj(ψi1 |ρ, . . . , ψij |ρ, φ|ρ) is satisfied, and the formula 1 (“true”) is
an axiom.1
1This last condition is a technical condition that usually requires a trivial modification of any proof system to
accommodate. We can usually do without this condition in actuality, but the details depend on the proof system.
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So, when a proof system is restriction-closed, given a derivation of a formula ϕ from ψ1, . . . , ψk,
we can extract a derivation of ϕ|ρ from ψ1|ρ, . . . , ψk|ρ for any partial assignment ρ such that the
steps of the proof consist of formulas mentioning only the variables masked in ρ. (In particular, we
could think of this as a proof in a proof system for a logic with variables {xi : ρi = ∗}.) In a sense,
this means that we can extract a proof of a “special case” from a more general proof by applying
the restriction operator to every formula in the proof. Again, looking ahead to Section 4, we will
see that the typical examples of propositional proof systems that have been considered essentially
have this property.
We will be especially interested in limited versions of the decision problem for a logic given by a
collection of “simple” proofs—if the proofs are sufficiently restricted, it is possible to give efficient
algorithms to search for such proofs, and then such a limited version of the decision problem will
be tractable, in contrast to the general case. Formally, now:
Definition 11 (Limited decision problem) Fix a proof system, and let S be a set of proofs in
the proof system. The limited decision problem for S is then the following promise problem: given
as input a formula ϕ with no free variables and a set of hypotheses H such that either there is a
proof of ϕ in S from H or else H 6|= ϕ, decide which case holds.
A classic example of such a limited decision problem for which efficient algorithms exist is for
formulas of propositional logic that have “treelike” resolution derivations of constant width (cf.
the work of Ben-Sasson and Wigderson [7] or the work of Beame and Pitassi [6], building on work
by Clegg et al. [11]). We will actually return to this example in more detail in Section 4, but we
mention it now for the sake of concreteness.
We will thus be interested in syntactic restrictions of restriction-closed proof systems. We wish
to know that (in contrast to the rules of the proof system) these syntactic restrictions are likewise
closed under restrictions in the following sense:
Definition 12 (Restriction-closed set of proofs) A set of proofs S is said to be restriction
closed if whenever there is a proof of a formula ϕ from a set of hypotheses H in S, there is also a
proof of ϕ|ρ in from the set H|ρ in S for any partial assignment ρ.
3 Inferences from incomplete data with implicit learning
A well-known general phenomenon in learning theory is that a restrictive choice of representation
for hypotheses often imposes artificial computational difficulties. Since fitting a hypothesis is often
a source of intractability, it is natural to suspect that one would often be able to achieve more if the
need for such an explicit hypothesis were circumvented—that is, if “learning” were integrated more
tightly into the application using the knowledge extracted from data. For the application of answer-
ing queries, this insight was pursued by Khardon and Roth [30] in the learning to reason framework,
where queries against an unknown DNF could be answered using examples. The trivial algorithm
that evaluates formulas on complete assignments and uses the fraction satisfied to estimate the
validity suggests how this might happen: the examples themselves encode the needed information
and so it is easier to answer the queries using the examples directly. In this case, the knowledge is
used implicitly: the existence of the DNF describing the support of the distribution (thus, governing
which models need to be considered) guarantees that the behavior of the algorithm is correct, but
at no point does the algorithm “discover” the representation of such a DNF. Effectively, we will
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Algorithm 1: DecidePAC
parameter: Algorithm A solving the limited decision problem for the class of proofs S.
input : Formula ϕ, ǫ, δ, γ ∈ (0, 1), list of partial assignments ρ(1), . . . , ρ(m) from M(D),
list of hypothesis formulas H
output : Accept if there is a proof of ϕ in S from H and formulas ψ1, ψ2, . . . that are
simultaneously witnessed true with probability at least 1− ǫ+ γ on M(D);
Reject if H ⇒ ϕ is not (1− ǫ− γ)-valid under D.
begin
B ← ⌊ǫ ·m⌋, FAILED ← 0.
foreach partial assignment ρ(i) in the list do
if A(ϕ|ρ(i) ,H|ρ) rejects then
Increment FAILED. if FAILED > B then
return Reject
return Accept
develop an alternative approach that incorporates reasoning to cope with incomplete examples and
explicit background knowledge, and yet retains the appealing circumvention of the construction of
explicit representations for learned knowledge. In this approach, there are “axioms” that can be
extracted from the observable data, which we suppose that if known, could be combined with the
background knowledge to answer a given query.
More formally, these “axioms” are formulas for which it is feasible to verify consistency with
the underlying distribution (from the masked examples), that nevertheless suffice to complete a
proof. This is necessary in some sense (cf. Proposition 32), and at least seems to be not much more
restrictive than the requirements imposed by concept learning. Specifically, we will utilize formulas
that are witnessed to evaluate to true on the distribution over partial assignments with probability
at least (1 − ǫ). We will consider any such formulas to be “fair game” for our algorithm, much as
any member of a given concept class is “fair game” for concept learning.
We now state and prove the main theorem, showing that a variant of the limited decision
problem in which the proof may invoke these learnable formulas as “axioms” is essentially no
harder than the original limited decision problem, as long as the proof system is restriction-closed.
The reduction is very simple and is given in Algorithm 1.
Theorem 13 (Adding implicit learning preserves tractability) Let S be a restriction-closed
set of proofs for a restriction-closed proof system. Suppose that there is an algorithm for the limited
decision problem for S running in time T (n, |ϕ|, |H|) on input ϕ and H over n variables. Let D be
a distribution over assignments, M be any masking process, and H be any set of formulas. Then
there is an algorithm that, on input ϕ, H, δ and ǫ, uses O(1/γ2 log 1/δ) examples, runs in time




), and such that given that either
• [H ⇒ ϕ] is not (1− ǫ− γ)-valid with respect to D or
• there exists a proof ϕ from {ψ1, . . . , ψk} ∪ H in S such that ψ1, . . . , ψk are all witnessed to
evaluate to true with probability (1− ǫ+ γ) over M(D)
decides which case holds.
Proof: Suppose we run Algorithm 1 on m = 12γ2 ln
1
δ
examples drawn from D. Then, (noting
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that we need at most logm bits of precision for B) the claimed running time bound and sample
complexity is immediate.
As for correctness, first note that by the soundness of the proof system, whenever there is
a proof of ϕ|ρ(i) from H|ρ(i) , ϕ|ρ(i) must evaluate to true in any interpretation of the remaining
variables consistent with H|ρ(i) . Thus, if H ⇒ ϕ is not (1 − ǫ − γ)-valid with respect to D, an
interpretation sampled from D must satisfy H and falsify ϕ with probability at least ǫ + γ; for
any partial assignment ρ derived from this interpretation (i.e., sampled from M(D)), the original
interpretation is still consistent, and therefore H|ρ 6|= ϕ|ρ for this ρ. So in summary, we see that a
ρ sampled from M(D) produces a formula ϕ|ρ such that H|ρ 6|= ϕ|ρ with probability at least ǫ+ γ,
and so the limited decision algorithm A rejects with probability at least ǫ + γ. It follows from
Hoeffding’s inequality now that for m as specified above, at least ǫm of the runs of A reject (and
hence the algorithm rejects) with probability at least 1− δ.
So, suppose instead that there is a proof in S of ϕ from H and some formulas ψ1, . . . , ψk that
are all witnessed to evaluate to true with probability at least (1 − ǫ + γ) over M(D). Then, with
probability (1 − ǫ + γ), ψ1|ρ, . . . , ψk|ρ = 1. Then, since S is a restriction closed set, if we replace
each assertion of some ψj with an invocation of R0 for the axiom 1, then by applying the restriction
ρ to every formula in the proof, one can obtain a proof of ϕ|ρ from H|ρ alone. Therefore, as A
solves the limited decision problem for S, we see that for each ρ drawn from M(D), A(ϕ|ρ,H|ρ)
must accept with probability at least (1 − ǫ + γ), and Hoeffding’s inequality again gives that the
probability that more than ǫm of the runs reject is at most δ for this choice of m.
The necessity of computationally feasible witnessing. The reader may, at this point, feel
that our notion of witnessed values is somewhat ad-hoc, and suspect that perhaps a weaker notion
should be considered (corresponding to a broader class of masking processes). Although it may
be the case that a better notion exists, we observe in Appendix A that it is crucial that we
use some kind of evaluation algorithm on partial assignments that is computationally feasible.
Witnessed evaluation is thus, at least, one such notion, whereas other natural notions are likely
computationally infeasible, and thus inappropriate for such purposes.
4 Proof systems with tractable, restriction-closed special cases
We now show that most of the usual propositional proof systems considered in the literature possess
natural restriction-closed special cases, for which the limited decision problem may be efficiently
solved. Thus, in each case, we can invoke Theorem 13 to show that we can efficiently integrate
implicit learning into the reasoning algorithm for the proof system.
4.1 Special cases of resolution
Our first example of a proof system for use in reasoning in PAC-Semantics is resolution, a standard
object of study in proof theory. Largely due to its simplicity, resolution turned out to be an excellent
system for the design of surprisingly effective proof search algorithms such as DPLL [14, 13].
Resolution thus remains attractive as a proof system possessing natural special cases for which we
can design relatively efficient algorithms for proof search. We will recall two such examples here.
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The resolution proof system. Resolution is a proof system that operates on clauses—disjunctions
of literals. The main inference rule in resolution is the cut rule: given two clauses containing a com-
plementary pair of literals (i.e., one contains the negation of a variable appearing without negation
in the other) A ∨ x and B ∨ ¬x, we infer the resolvent A ∨ B. We will also find it convenient to
use the weakening rule: from any clause C, for any set of literals ℓ1, . . . , ℓk, we can infer the clause
C ∨ ℓ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ℓk. As stated, resolution derives new clauses from a set of known clauses (a CNF
formula). Typically, one actually refers to resolution as a proof system for DNF formulas by using
a resolution proof as a proof by contradiction: one shows how the unsatisfiable empty clause ⊥ can
be derived from the negation of the input DNF. This is referred to as a resolution refutation of the
target DNF, and can also incorporate explicit hypotheses given as CNF formulas.
Treelike resolution proofs. The main syntactic restriction we consider on resolution refutations
intuitively corresponds to a restriction that a clause has to be derived anew each time we wish to
use it in a proof—a restriction that the proof may not (re-)use “lemmas.” It will not be hard
to see that while this does not impact the completeness of the system since derivations may be
repeated, this workaround comes at the cost of increasing the size of the proof. A syntactic way of
capturing these proofs proceeds by recalling that the proof is given by a sequence of clauses that
are either derived from earlier clauses in the sequence, or appear in the input CNF formula (to be
refuted). Consider the following directed acyclic graph (DAG) corresponding to any (resolution)
proof: the set of nodes of the graph is given by the set of clauses appearing in the lines of the proof,
and each such node has incoming edges from the nodes corresponding to the clauses earlier in the
proof used in its derivation; the clauses that appeared in the input CNF formula are therefore the
sources of this DAG, and the clause proved by the derivation corresponds to a sink of the DAG
(i.e., in a resolution refutation, the empty clause appears at a sink of the DAG). We say that the
proof is treelike when this DAG is a (rooted) tree—i.e., each node has at most one outgoing edge
(equivalently, when there is a unique path from any node to the unique sink). Notice, the edges
correspond to the use of a clause in a step of the proof, so this syntactic restriction corresponds to
our intuitive notion described earlier.
We are interested in resolution as a proof system with special cases that not only possess efficient
decision algorithms, but are furthermore restriction-closed. We will first establish that (treelike)
resolution in general is restriction-closed, and subsequently consider the effects of our additional
restrictions on the proofs considered. For syntactic reasons (to satisfy Definition 10), actually, we
need to include a tautological formula 1 as an axiom of resolution. We can take this to correspond
to the clause containing all literals, which is always derivable by weakening from any nonempty set
of clauses (and is furthermore essentially useless in any resolution proof, as it can only be used to
derive itself).
Proposition 14 (Treelike resolution is restriction-closed) Resolution is a restriction-closed
proof system. Moreover, the set of treelike resolution proofs of length L is restriction-closed.
Proof: Assuming the inclusion of the tautological axiom 1 as discussed above, the restriction-
closedness is straightforward: Fix an partial assignment ρ, and consider any step of the proof,
deriving a clause C. If C appeared in the input formula, then C|ρ appears in the restriction of the
input formula. Otherwise, C is derived by one of our two rules, cut or weakening. For the cut rule,
suppose C is derived from A ∨ xi and B ∨ ¬xi. If ρi ∈ {0, 1} then C can either be derived from
(A∨xi)|ρ or (B ∨¬xi)|ρ by weakening. If ρi = ∗ and C|ρ 6= 1, then both (A∨xi)|ρ and (B ∨¬xi)|ρ
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are not 1, and the same literals are eliminated (set to 0) in these clauses as in C|ρ, so C|ρ follows
from the cut rule applied to xi on these clauses. If C|ρ 6= 1 followed from weakening of some other
clause C ′, we know C ′|ρ 6= 1 as well, since any satisfied literals in C
′ appear in C; therefore C|ρ
follows from weakening applied to C ′|ρ. Finally, if C|ρ = 1, then we already know that 1 can be
asserted as an axiom. So, resolution is restriction-closed.
Recalling the DAG corresponding to a resolution proof has nodes corresponding to clauses
and edges indicating which clauses are used in the derivation of which nodes, note that the DAG
corresponding to the restriction of a resolution proof as constructed in the previous paragraph has
no additional edges. Therefore, the sink in the original DAG remains a sink. Although the DAG
may now be disconnected, if consider the connected component containing the node corresponding
to the original sink, we see that this is indeed a tree; furthermore, since every clause involved in the
derivation of a clause corresponding to a node of the tree corresponds to another node of the tree
and the overall DAG corresponded to a syntactically correct resolution proof from the restriction
of the input formula, by the restriction-closedness of resolution, this tree corresponds to a treelike
resolution proof of the restriction of the clause labeling the sink from the restriction of the input
formula. As this is a subgraph of the original graph, it corresponds to a proof that is also no longer
than the original, as needed.
Bounded-space treelike resolution. Our first special case assumes not only that the resolution
proof is treelike, but also that it can be carried out using limited space, in the sense first explored
by Esteban and Tora´n [18]. That is, we associate with each step of the proof a set of clauses
that we refer to as the blackboard. Each time a clause is derived during a step of the proof, we
consider it to be added to the blackboard; we also allow any clauses in the blackboard to be erased
across subsequent steps of the proof. Now, the central restriction is that instead of simply requiring
the steps of the proof to utilize clauses that appeared earlier in the proof, we demand that they
only utilize clauses that appeared in the blackboard set on the previous step. We now say that the
proof uses (clause) space s if the blackboard never contains more than s clauses. We note that
the restriction that the proof is treelike means that each time we utilize clauses in a derivation, we
are free to delete them from the blackboard. In fact, given the notion of a blackboard, it is easily
verified that this is an equivalent definition of a treelike proof. Even with the added restriction to
clause space s, treelike resolution remains restriction-closed:
Proposition 15 The set of clause space-s treelike resolution proofs is restriction closed.
Proof: Let a space-s treelike resolution proof Π and any partial assignment ρ be given; we
recall the corresponding treelike proof Π′ constructed in the proof of Proposition 14; we suppose
that Π derives the sequence of clauses {Ci}
|Π|
i=1 (for which Ci is derived on the ith step of Π) and
Π′ derives the subsequence {Cij |ρ}
|Π′|
j=1. Given the corresponding sequence of blackboards {Bi}
|Π|
i=1
establishing that Π can be carried out in clause space s, we construct a sequence of blackboards
B′i = {Cj |ρ : Cj ∈ Bi,∃k s.t. j = ik} for Π




It is immediate that every B′ij contains at most s clauses, so we only need to establish that
these are a legal sequence of blackboards for Π′. We first note that whenever a clause is added to
a blackboard B′ij over B
′
ij−1
, then since (by construction) it was not added in i′ ∈ [ij−1, ij ] it must
be that it is added (to Bij ) in step ij , which we know originally derived Cij in Π, and hence in
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Algorithm 2: SearchSpace
input : CNF ϕ, integer space bound s ≥ 1, current clause C
output: A space-s treelike resolution proof of C from clauses in ϕ, or “none” if no such
proof exists.
begin
if C is a superset of some clause C ′ of ϕ then
return The weakening derivation of C from C ′.
else if s > 1 then
foreach Literal ℓ such that neither ℓ nor ¬ℓ is in C do
if Π1 ←SearchSpace (ϕ, s − 1, C ∨ ℓ) does not return none then
if Π2 ←SearchSpace (ϕ, s, C ∨ ¬ℓ) does not return none then




Π′ derives Cij |ρ by construction of Π
′ (so this is the corresponding jth step of Π′). Likewise, if a
clause is needed for the derivation of any jth step of Π′, by the construction of Π′ from Π, it must
be that Cij |ρ 6= 1 and whenever some step ij of Π uses an unsatisfied clause from some earlier step
t of Π, then Π′ includes the step corresponding to t. Therefore there exists k such that t = ik; and,





j=1 is a legal sequence of blackboards for Π
′.
The algorithm for finding space-s resolution proofs, SearchSpace, appears as Algorithm 2. Al-
though the analysis of this algorithm appears elsewhere, we include the proof (and its history) in
Appendix B for completeness.
Theorem 16 (SearchSpace finds space-s treelike proofs when they exist) If there is a space-
s treelike proof of a clause C from a CNF formula ϕ, then SearchSpace returns such a proof, and
otherwise it returns “none.” In either case, it runs in time O(|ϕ| · n2(s−1)) where n is the number
of variables.
Naturally, we can convert SearchSpace into a decision algorithm by accepting precisely when it
returns a proof. Therefore, as space-s treelike resolution proofs are restriction-closed by Proposi-
tion 15, Theorem 13 can be applied to obtain an algorithm that efficiently learns implicitly from
example partial assignments to solve the corresponding limited decision problem for (1− ǫ)-validity
with space-s treelike resolution proofs. Explicitly, we obtain:
Corollary 17 (Implicit learning in space-bounded treelike resolution) Let a KB CNF φ
and clause C be given, and suppose that partial assignments are drawn from a masking process for
an underlying distribution D; suppose further that either
1. There exists some CNF ψ such that partial assignments from the masking process are witnessed
to satisfy ψ with probability at least (1− ǫ+ γ) and there is a space-s treelike proof of C from
φ ∧ ψ or else
2. [φ⇒ C] is at most (1− ǫ− γ)-valid with respect to D for γ > 0.
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) that distinguishes these cases with





A quasipolynomial time algorithm for treelike resolution. As we noted previously, Beame
and Pitassi [6] gave an algorithm essentially similar to SearchSpace, but only established that it
could find treelike proofs in quasipolynomial time. Their result follows from Theorem 16 and the
following generic space bound:
Proposition 18 A treelike proof Π can be carried out in clause space at most log2 |Π|+ 1.
So therefore, if there is a treelike proof of a clause C from a formula ϕ of size nk, SearchSpace
(run with the bound s = k log n + 1) finds the proof in time O(|ϕ| · n2k logn). We also include the
proof in Appendix B.
Bounded-width resolution. Our second special case of resolution considers proofs using small
clauses. Precisely, we refer to the number of literals appearing in a clause as the width of the clause,
and we naturally consider the width of a resolution proof to be the maximum width of any clause
derived in the proof (i.e., excluding the input clauses). Bounded-width resolution was originally
formally investigated by Galil [20], who exhibited an efficient dynamic programming algorithm for
bounded-width resolution. Galil’s algorithm easily generalizes to k-DNF resolution, i.e., the proof
system RES(k), (with standard resolution being recovered by k = 1) so we will present the more
general case here.
Briefly, RES(k), introduced by Kraj´ıcˇek [32], is a proof system that generalizes resolution by
operating on k-DNF formulas instead of clauses (which are, of course, 1-DNF formulas) and in-
troduces some new inference rules, described below. In more detail, recall that a k-DNF is a
disjunction of conjunctions of literals, where each conjunction contains at most k literals. Each
step of a RES(k) proof derives a k-DNF from one of the following rules. Weakening is essentially
similar to the analogous rule in resolution: from a k-DNF ϕ, we can infer the k-DNF ϕ∨ψ for any
k-DNF ψ. RES(k) also features an essentially similar cut rule: from a k-DNF A ∨ (ℓ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ℓj)
(j ≤ k) and another k-DNF B∨¬ℓ1∨· · ·∨¬ℓj, we can infer the k-DNF A∨B. The new rules involve
manipulating the conjunctions: given j ≤ k formulas ℓ1∨A, . . . , ℓj∨A, we can infer (ℓ1∧· · ·∧ℓj)∨A
by ∧-introduction. Likewise, given (ℓ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ℓj) ∨ A, we can infer ℓi ∨ A for any i = 1, . . . , j by
∧-elimination.
We wish to show that RES(k) is restriction-closed; actually, for technical simplicity, we will
represent 1 by the disjunction of all literals. This can be derived from any DNF by a linear number
of ∧-elimination steps (in the size of the original DNF) followed by a weakening step, so it is not
increasing the power of RES(k) appreciably to include such a rule.
Proposition 19 For any k, RES(k) is restriction-closed.
Proof: We are given (by assumption) that our encoding of 1 is an axiom. Let any partial
assignment ρ be given, and consider the DNF ϕ derived on any step of the proof. Naturally, if
ϕ was a hypothesis, then ϕ|ρ is also a hypothesis. Otherwise, it was derived by one of the four
inference rules. We suppose that ϕ|ρ 6= 1 (or else we are done). Thus, if ϕ was derived by weakening
from ψ, it must be the case that ψ|ρ 6= 1, since otherwise ϕ|ρ = 1, so ϕ|ρ follows from ψ|ρ again
by weakening since every conjunction in ψ|ρ appears in ϕ|ρ. Likewise, if ϕ = ℓi ∨A was derived by
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∧-elimination from ψ = (ℓ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ℓj) ∨A, then since ℓi|ρ 6= 1 and A|ρ must not be 1, neither the
conjunction ℓi was taken from in ψ nor the rest of the formula A evaluates to 1 and thus ψ|ρ 6= 1.
Then, if some ℓt is set to 0 by ρ, ψ|ρ = A|ρ, and ϕ|ρ follows from ψ|ρ by weakening; otherwise, ϕ|ρ
still follows by ∧-elimination.
We now turn to consider ϕ = (ℓ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ℓj) ∨ A that were derived by ∧-introduction. We first
consider the case where some literal ℓi in the new conjunction is set to 0 in ρ (and so ϕ|ρ = A|ρ). In
this case, one of the premises in the ∧-introduction step was ℓi ∨A, where (ℓi ∨A)|ρ = A|ρ = ϕ|ρ,
so in fact ϕ|ρ can be derived just as ℓi ∨A was derived. We now suppose that no ℓi is set to 0 in ρ;
let ℓi1 , . . . , ℓis denote the subset of those literals that are not set to 1 (i.e., satisfy ℓit |ρ = ℓit). Then
ϕ|ρ = (ℓi1 ∧ · · · ∧ ℓis) ∨ A|ρ, where since A|ρ 6= 1, the premises ℓit ∨ A used to derive ϕ all satisfy
(ℓit ∨A)|ρ = ℓit ∨A|ρ 6= 1, and so we can again derive ϕ|ρ by ∧-introduction from this subset of the
original premises.
Finally, we suppose that ϕ = A∨B we derived by the cut rule applied to A∨ (ℓ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ℓj) and
B∨¬ℓ1∨· · ·∨¬ℓj. If some ℓi is set to 0 by ρ, then the first premise satisifies (A∨ (ℓ1∧· · ·∧ ℓj))|ρ =
A|ρ and so ϕ|ρ = A|ρ ∨ B|ρ can be derived by weakening from the first premise. If not, we let
ℓi1 , . . . , ℓis denote the subset of those literals that are not set to 1. Then the first premise becomes
A|ρ ∨ (ℓi1 ∧ · · · ∧ ℓis) 6= 1 (since we assumed ϕ|ρ 6= 1) and likewise, the second premise becomes
B|ρ ∨ ¬ℓi1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ℓis 6= 1 (as likewise B|ρ 6= 1 and no ℓit |ρ = 0), so ϕ|ρ follows by the cut rule
applied to these two premises.
Now, RES(k) possesses a “bounded-width” restriction for which we will observe has a limited
decision problem that can be solved by a dynamic programming algorithm (given in pseudocode as
Algorithm 3). More precisely, we will say that a DNF has width w if it is a disjunction of at most
w conjunctions, and so likewise the width of a RES(k) proof is the maximum width of any k-DNF
derived in the proof.
Theorem 20 (Efficient decision of bounded-width RES(k)) Algorithm 3 accepts iff there is
a RES(k) proof of its input φ from the input k-DNF formulas ϕ1 . . . , ϕℓ of width at most w. If
there are n variables, it runs in time O(nkw+1(nkw + ℓ)k max{knkw, |ϕi|}).
Proof: The correctness is straightforward: if there is a width-w RES(k) proof, then a new
derivation step from the proof is performed on each iteration of the main loop until φ is derived,
and conversely, every time T [ψ] is set to 1, a width-w derivation of ψ could be extracted from the
run of the algorithm. So, it only remains to consider the running time.
The main observation is that there are at most O(nkw) width-w k-DNFs. (The initialization
thus takes time at most O(nkwℓ).) At least one of these must be derived on each iteration. Each
iteration considers all possible derivations using up to k distinct formulas either in the table or
given in the input, of which there are O((nkw+ ℓ)k) tuples. We thus need to consider only the time
to check each of the possible derivations.
A formula ψ1 must be a width-w k-DNF for another width-w k-DNF ψ
′ to be derivable via
weakening, and then for each other width-w k-DNF ψ′, we can check whether or not it is a weakening
of ψ1 in time O(n
kw) by just checking whether all of the conjunctions of ψ1 appear in ψ
′. Likewise,
for ∧-introduction, the formula must already be a width-w k-DNF, and we can check whether or
not the j ≤ k formulas have a shared common part by first checking which conjunctions from the
first formula appear in the second, and then, if only one literal is left over in each, checking that
the other j − 2 formulas have the same common parts with one literal left over. We then obtain
the resulting derivation by collecting these j literals, in an overall time of O(knkw).
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For the ∧-elimination rule, the formula must already be width-w for us to obtain a width-w
result. Then, we can easily generate each of the possible results in time linear in the length of
the formula, that is, O(nkw). For the cut rule, we only need to examine each conjunction of each
formula, and check if the literals appear negated among the conjunctions of the other formula,
taking time linear in the size of the formulas, which is O(max{nkw, |ϕi|}); checking that the result
is a width-w k-DNF then likewise can be done in linear time in the size of the formulas.
Finally, we note that the width-w syntactic restriction of RES(k) refutations is restriction-closed:
Proposition 21 The set of width-w RES(k) refutations is restriction-closed.
Proof: Let any width-w RES(k) refutation Π and partial assignment ρ be given. In the con-
struction used in Proposition 19, we obtained a proof Π′ of ⊥|ρ = ⊥ from Π with the property that
every formula ψ′ appearing in Π′ satisfies ψ′ = ψ|ρ for some ψ appearing in Π. Furthermore, we
guaranteed that no derivation step used a formula that simplified to 1. It therefore suffices to note
that for any width-w k-DNF ψ, ψ|ρ is also a k-DNF with width at most w.
By Theorem 13, DecidePAC can be applied to Algorithm 3 to obtain a second implicit learning
algorithm, for a width-w RES(k).
Corollary 22 (Implicit learning in bounded-width RES(k)) Let a KB of k-DNFs φ1 . . . , φℓ
and target disjunction of k-CNFs ϕ be given, and suppose that partial assignments are drawn from
a masking process for an underlying distribution D; suppose further that either
1. There exists some conjunction of k-DNFs ψ such that partial assignments from the masking
process are witnessed to satisfy ψ with probability at least (1 − ǫ+ γ) and there is a width-w
RES(k) refutation of ¬ϕ ∧ φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φℓ ∧ ψ or else
2. [φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φℓ ⇒ ϕ] is at most (1− ǫ− γ)-valid with respect to D for γ > 0.













4.2 Degree-bounded polynomial calculus
Our next example proof system is Polynomial calculus, an algebraic proof system originally intro-
duced by Clegg et al. [11] as a (first) example of a proof system that could simulate resolution (the
gold standard for theorem-proving heuristics) on the one hand, and possessing a natural special
case for which the limited decision problem could demonstrably be solved in polynomial time using
a now standard computer algebra algorithm, the Gro¨bner basis algorithm due to Buchberger [8].
Although the original hopes of Clegg et al. – that polynomial calculus might one day supplant
resolution as the proof system of choice – have not been fulfilled due to the fact that heuristics
based on resolution have been observed to perform spectacularly well in practice, it nevertheless
represents a potentially more powerful system that furthermore alludes to the diversity possible
among proof systems.
The polynomial calculus proof system. In polynomial calculus, formulas have the form of
polynomial equations over an arbitrary nontrivial field F (for the present purposes, assume F is
Q, the field of rationals), and we are interested in their Boolean solutions. A set of hypotheses is
thus a system of equations, and polynomial calculus enables us to derive new constraints that are
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satisfied by any Boolean solutions to the original system. Of course, in this correspondence, our
Boolean variables serve as the variables of the polynomials.
More formally, for our Boolean variables x1, . . . , xn, our formulas are equations of the form [p =
0] for p ∈ F[x1, . . . , xn] (i.e., formal multivariate polynomials over the field F with indeterminates
given by the variables). We require that the polynomials are represented as a sum of monomials:










i are the monomials corresponding to the
degree vector s. For each variable, the proof system has a Boolean axiom [x2−x = 0] (asserting that
x ∈ {0, 1}). The rules of inference are linear combination, which asserts that for equations [p = 0]
and [q = 0], for any coefficients a and b from F, we can infer [a · p + b · q = 0]; and multiplication,
which asserts that for any variable (indeterminate) x and polynomial equation [p = 0], we can
derive [x · p = 0]. A refutation in polynomial calculus is a derivation of the polynomial 1, i.e., the
contradictory equation [1 = 0]. We will encode “true” as the equation [0 = 0], and we will modify
the system to allow this equation to be asserted as an axiom; of course, it can be derived in a single
step from any polynomial calculus formula [p = 0] by the linear combination p + (−1)p, so we are
essentially not changing the power of the proof system at all.
We also note that without loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to formulas in which
no indeterminate appears in a monomial with degree greater than one—such monomials are referred
to as multilinear. Intuitively this is so because the Boolean axioms assert that a larger power can
be replaced by a smaller one; formally, one could derive this as follows: Suppose we have a formula
with a monomial expression xk ·m. Then by multiplying the Boolean axiom by x k− 2 times, and
then by the indeterminates in m, one obtains [xk ·m − xk−1 ·m = 0]. A linear combination with
the original formula then yields an expression with the original monomial replaced by xk−1 ·m, so
by repeating this trick k − 2 additional times, we eventually reduce the monomial to x ·m. The
same trick can be applied to the rest of the indeterminates appearing in m, and then to the rest
of the monomials in the formula. We will refer to this as the multilinearization of the formula.
(The original formula could be re-derived by a similar series of steps, so nothing is lost in this
translation.) Looking ahead, we will be focusing on the degree-bounded restriction of polynomial
calculus, and so we will assume for simplicity that all formulas are expressed in this multilinearized
(minimal-degree) form. Of course, because the translation can be performed in a number of steps
that is quadratic in the total degree and linear in the size of the formula, this does not alter the
power of the proof system by much at all.
A note on witnessing and restrictions. The polynomial equations can be fit into our frame-
work of restrictions and witnessing somewhat naturally, thanks to our restriction to the sum of
monomials representation: since we have restricted our attention to cases where each variable
(hence, indeterminate in the polynomial) takes only Boolean values, we observe that a monomial
corresponds (precisely) to a conjunction over the set of variables in the support of its degree vector.



















































where we thus denote the polynomial arising from applying ρ to [p = 0] by p|ρ.
This has the effect that the polynomial equation is witnessed true if all of the monomials (with
nonzero coefficients) are witnessed, and the equation evaluates to 0, and witnessed false if enough
of the monomials are witnessed so that regardless of the settings of the rest of the variables, the
sum is either too large or too small to be zero. Once again, this is a weak kind of “witnessed
evaluation” that is nevertheless feasible, and saves us from trying to solve a system of multivariate
polynomial equations—which is easily seen to be NP-hard (NP-complete if we know we are only
interested in Boolean solutions).
Polynomial calculus with resolution. Although polynomial calculus can encode the literal
¬x as the polynomial (1−x), the effect of this choice on the encoding of a clause is undesirable: for
example, recalling the correspondence between monomials and conjunctions, the clause x1∨· · ·∨xn
corresponds to the polynomial (1− x1) · · · (1− xn) which has an exponential-size (in n) monomial
representation, and hence requires an exponential-size polynomial calculus formula. In the interest
of efficiently simulating resolution in polynomial calculus, Alekhnovich et al. [1] introduced the
following extension of polynomial calculus known as polynomial calculus with resolution (PCR):
the formulas are extended by introducing for each variable x, a new indeterminate x¯, related by
the complementarity axiom [x + x¯ − 1 = 0] (forcing x¯ = ¬x). We can thus represent any clause
ℓ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ℓk as a polynomial calculus formula using a single monomial [(¬ℓ1) · · · (¬ℓk) = 0] by
choosing the appropriate indeterminate for each ¬ℓi. The reader may verify that in such a case,
the cut rule is captured by adding the monomials (with coefficients of 1) and weakening may be
simulated by (repeated) multiplication.
For the purposes of (partial) evaluation in PCR, our intended semantics for the x¯ formulas is as
follows: a partial assignment ρ assigns ρ(x¯) = ∗ whenever ρ(x) = ∗, and otherwise ρ(x¯) = ¬ρ(x).
Proposition 23 Polynomial calculus and polynomial calculus with resolution are restriction-closed.
Proof: Let any partial assignment ρ be given. If a proof step asserts a hypothesis [p = 0],
then its restriction [p|ρ = 0] can also be asserted from the restriction of the hypothesis set. The
Boolean axiom [x2 − x = 0] can easily be seen to simplify to [0 = 0] if ρ assigns a value to x, and
otherwise [x2−x = 0]|ρ = [x
2−x = 0], so in the latter case we can simply assert the Boolean axiom
for x. For polynomial calculus with resolution, we need to further consider the complementarity
axioms, but as α is witnessed precisely when x¯ is witnessed, we again have that if ρ(x) 6= ∗, then
the complementarity axiom simplifies to [0 = 0], and otherwise [x+ x¯− 1 = 0]|ρ = [x+ x¯− 1 = 0],
so we can simply assert the corresponding complementarity axiom.
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Given our inclusion of [0 = 0] as an axiom, it only remains to show that the rules of inference
are preserved under partial evaluations. If ϕ is derived by a linear combination of [p = 0] and
[q = 0] (say ϕ is [ap + bq = 0]), then given our encoding of 1 as the formula [0 = 0], in any case,
(ap + bq)|ρ = a(p|ρ) + b(q|ρ), so ϕ|ρ follows by the same linear combination from [p = 0]|ρ and
[q = 0]|ρ. If ϕ is derived by multiplication by x from [p = 0], if ρ(x) = 0, then ϕ|ρ = [0 = 0], which
is an axiom. Two cases remain: either ρ(x) = 1, in which case ϕ|ρ = [p = 0]|ρ and so ϕ|ρ follows
trivially; or, ρ(x) = ∗ and so ϕ|ρ = [x · (p|ρ) = 0], so ϕ follows from [p = 0]|ρ by multiplication by
x.
4.2.1 Degree-bounded polynomial calculus
Given that the monomial representation of polynomials (in contrast to the clauses we considered
in resolution) may be of exponential size in n (the number of variables), it is natural to wish to
consider a restricted class of formulas in which the representations of formulas are guaranteed to
be of polynomial size. One way to achieve this is to consider only degree-d polynomials for some







= O(nd) (multilinear) monomials, and so (as long
as the coefficients are reasonably small) we have a polynomial-size representation. We assume that
an ordering of the monomials has been fixed (e.g., in the representation) such that monomials with
larger degree are considered “larger” in the ordering. We refer to the first monomial in this ordering
with a nonzero coefficient as the leading monomial in a polynomial. We will refer to the degree
of a polynomial calculus or PCR proof as the maximum degree of any polynomial appearing in a
formula used in the proof. We observe that width-w resolution can be simulated by degree-w PCR
proofs; thus, in a sense, degree-bounded polynomial calculus is a natural generalization of width-w
resolution.
Degree-bounded polynomial calculus in particular was also first studied by Clegg et al. [11].
The central observation is that the polynomials derivable in bounded degree polynomial calculus
form a vector space; the decision algorithm (given as Algorithm 4) will then simply construct a
basis for this space and use the basis to check if the query lies within the space.
Theorem 24 (Analysis of decision algorithm for degree-d PC/PCR - Theorem 3, [11])
Algorithm 4 solves the limited decision problem for degree-d polynomial calculus (resp. PCR). It
runs in time O((nd + ℓ)n2d) where n is the number of indeterminates (variables for polynomial
calculus, literals for PCR).
As the proof appears in the work of Clegg et al. [11], we refer the reader there for details. Clegg
et al. [11] also give another algorithm based on the Gro¨bner basis algorithm that does not compute
an entire basis. Although their analysis gives a worse worst-case running time for this alternative
algorithm, they believe that it may be more practical; the interested reader should consult the
original paper for details.
In any case, we now return to pursuing our main objective, using Algorithm 4 to obtain algo-
rithms for implicit learning from examples in polynomial calculus and PCR. We first need to know
that the degree-d restrictions of these proof systems are restriction-closed, which turns out to be
easily established:
Proposition 25 For both polynomial calculus and PCR, the sets of proofs of degree d are restriction-
closed.
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Proof: We noted in Proposition 23 that the restriction of any polynomial calculus (resp. PCR)
proof is a valid polynomial calculus (resp. PCR) proof. Let any partial assignment ρ be given;
recalling the connection between monomials and conjunctions, we note that for any monomial
xi1 · · · xik k ≤ d appearing in a formula in a degree-d polynomial calculus or PCR proof, the




which has degree at most k ≤ d. Thus, the degrees can only decrease, so the restriction of the proof
under ρ is also a degree-d proof.
We therefore obtain the following corollary from Theorem 13:
Corollary 26 (Implicit learning in degree-bounded polynomial calculus and PCR) Let a
list of degree-d polynomials p1, . . . , pℓ and q be given, and suppose that partial assignments are drawn
from a masking process for an underlying distribution D; suppose further that either
1. There exists some list of polynomials h1, . . . , hk such that partial assignments from the masking
process are witnessed to satisfy [h1 = 0], . . . , [hk = 0] with probability at least (1 − ǫ + γ)
and there is a degree-d polynomial calculus (resp. PCR) derivation of [q = 0] from [p1 =
0], . . . , [pℓ = 0], [h1 = 0], . . . , [hk = 0] or else
2. [(p1 = 0) ∧ · · · ∧ (pℓ = 0)⇒ (q = 0)] is at most (1− ǫ− γ)-valid with respect to D for γ > 0.
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4.3 Sparse, bounded cutting planes
In integer linear programming, one is interested in determining integer solutions to a system of linear
inequalities; cutting planes [23] were introduced as a technique to improve the formulation of an
integer linear program by deriving new inequalities that are satisfied by the integer solutions to the
system of inequalities, but not by all of the fractional solutions. The current formulation of cutting
planes is due to Chva´tal [10], and it was explicitly cast as a propositional proof system by Cook et
al. [12] where the objective is to prove that a system has no feasible integer solutions. Much like
resolution, cutting planes are not only simple and natural, surprisingly, they are also complete [10,
12]. Furthermore, Cook et al. [12] noted that cutting planes could easily simulate resolution, and
that some formulas that were hard for resolution (encoding the “pigeonhole principle”) had simple
cutting plane proofs.
We can also give a syntactic analogue of bounded-width in resolution for cutting planes which
will enable us to state a limited decision problem with an efficient algorithm. Although this restric-
tion of cutting planes will not be able to express the hard examples for resolution, their simplicity
and connections to optimization make them a potentially appealing direction for future work.
The cutting planes proof system. The formulas of cutting planes are inequalities of the form
[
∑k
i=1 cixi ≥ b] where each xi is a variable and c1, . . . , ck and b are integers. Naturally, we will
restrict our attention to {0, 1}-integer linear programs (i.e., Boolean-valued), so our system will
feature axioms of the form x ≥ 0 and −x ≥ −1 (i.e., x ≤ 1) for each variable x. Naturally, we
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(1)+b(2)]. We will also allow
ourselves to multiply an inequality [
∑k




ci)xi ≥ d ·b]. Finally, the key rule is division: given an inequality of the form [
∑k
i=1(d ·ci)xi ≥ b] for
a positive integer d (i.e., a common divisor of the coefficients) we can derive [
∑k
i=1 cixi ≥ ⌈b/d⌉];
crucially, this derivation is only sound due to the fact that the xi are assumed to take integer
values. It is the fact that this rounding may “cut” into the region defined by the system of linear
inequalities that gives the proof system its name. A refutation in cutting planes is a derivation of
the (contradictory) inequality [0 ≥ 1].
Again, we will need to make some technical modifications that do not change the power of the
proof system by much. We will encode 1 as an axiom by the inequality 0 ≥ −1 which, we note,
can be trivially derived in two steps by the standard formulation of cutting planes. We will also
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(1)] that is witnessed
true in every partial assignment, specifically in the one that masks all variables—this means that∑k
i=1min{0, c
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(1)] could
be derived from the axioms in at most 3n + 2 steps if there are n variables while using only two
formulas’ worth of space, whereupon the final inequality follows by addition.
We will also find the following observation convenient: as restrictions are a kind of partial
evaluation, it is intuitively clear that we can perform the evaluation in stages and obtain the same
end result, that is:
Proposition 27 (Restrictions may be broken into stages) Let ρ be a partial assignment, and
let σ be another partial assignment such that for every variable xi, whenever ρi = ∗, σi = ∗, and
whenever σi ∈ {0, 1}, σi = ρi. Now, let τ be a partial assignment to the variables {xi : σi = ∗}
such that for every xi, σi = ρi. Then for every formula ϕ, ϕ|ρ = (ϕ|σ)|τ .
Proof: We can verify this by induction on the construction of ϕ:
• Naturally, for variables xi, either ρi = ∗, in which case xi|ρ = xi = (xi|σ)|τ , or else ρi ∈ {0, 1}
in which case either σi = ρi, or else xi|σ = xi, and then τi = ρi.
• If ϕ = ¬ψ, we have by the induction hypothesis that ψ|ρ = (ψ|σ)|τ . Regardless of whether or
not ϕ is witnessed, ϕ|ρ = ¬(ψ|ρ) = ¬((ψ|σ)|τ ) = (ϕ|σ)|τ .
• If ϕ = [
∑k
i=1 ciψi ≥ b], we again have by the induction hypothesis that for every ψi, ψi|ρ =
(ψi|σ)|τ , and thus, the same ψi are witnessed (to evaluate to true or false) in both cases.
– If ϕ is not witnessed in ρ, it is then immediate that ϕ|ρ = (ϕ|σ)|τ .
– If ϕ is witnessed in ρ, but not witnessed in σ, we observe that ϕ must be witnessed in τ
since the same set of formulas are witnessed to evaluate to true and false in both cases,
and therefore also again, ϕ|ρ = (ϕ|σ)|τ .
– Finally, when ϕ is witnessed in σ, we note that by the construction of witnessed values,
it does not matter what values the formulas witnessed by ρ but not σ take—ϕ must be
witnessed to take the same value under both ρ and σ. Then since (ϕ|σ)|τ = ϕ|σ ∈ {0, 1},
we see once again (ϕ|σ)|τ = ϕ|ρ.
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Proposition 28 Cutting planes is restriction-closed.
Proof: We are again given that our encoding of 1, 0 ≥ −1, is an axiom. Now, let any partial
assignment ρ be given. Again, for any hypothesis ϕ, asserted in the proof, ϕ|ρ can be asserted from
the set of restrictions of hypotheses. Likewise, for each axiom, if ρ assigns the variable a value,
then it simplifies to 1 (which is given as an axiom by assumption) and otherwise it remains an
assertion of the same axiom, so in either case it may still be asserted as an axiom. It thus remains
to consider formulas derived by our four inference rules.
We thus consider any formula ϕ derived in the proof that is not witnessed to evaluate to true
in ρ. If it was derived from a formula ψ by weakening, we note that if ψ|ρ = 1 (i.e., was witnessed
to evaluate to true), then since ϕ is the sum of ψ and another inequality ξ that is witnessed to
evaluate to true, we would have ϕ|ρ = 1 also, but it is not by assumption. Therefore also ψ|ρ 6= 1.
Furthermore, by Proposition 27, ξ|ρ is (also) witnessed true on every further partial assignment.
Therefore, ϕ|ρ = (ψ+ ξ)|ρ follows from ψ|ρ by weakening (with ξ|ρ). Similarly, if ϕ was derived by
addition of ψ and ξ, at least one of ψ and ξ must not be witnessed to evaluate to 1 under ρ; WLOG
suppose it is ψ. Then if ξ|ρ = 1, ϕ|ρ again follows from ψ|ρ by weakening. Finally, if neither ψ nor
ξ is witnessed to evaluate to true under ρ, we can derive ϕ|ρ from ψ|ρ and ξ|ρ by addition.
Multiplication is especially simple: we note that if ϕ = [
∑k
i=1(d · ci)xi ≥ d · b] is derived
by multiplication from ψ = [
∑k
i=1 cixi ≥ b], then ψ also follows from ϕ by division, and hence
ϕ|ρ = 1 iff ψ|ρ = 1 in this case; as we have assumed ϕ|ρ 6= 1, we note that we can derive ϕ|ρ
from ψ|ρ by multiplication by the same d. Finally, if ϕ = [
∑k
i=1 cixi ≥ ⌈b/d⌉] was derived from
ψ = [
∑k
i=1(d·ci)xi ≥ b] by division, we note (more carefully) that if ψ|ρ = 1, then as this means that∑
i:ρi=1
min{0, d · ci} ≥ b where the LHS is an integer, and hence also
∑
i:ρi=1
min{0, ci} ≥ ⌈b/d⌉,


















































ci is an integer.
4.3.1 Efficient algorithms for sparse, ℓ1-bounded cutting planes
We now turn to developing a syntactic restriction of cutting planes that features an efficient limited
decision algorithm.
Sparse cutting planes. The main restriction we use is to limit the number of variables appearing
in the threshold expression: we say that the formula is w-sparse if at most w variables appear in
the sum.2 Naturally, we say that a cutting planes proof is w-sparse if every formula appearing in
the proof is w-sparse.
2Naturally, this is a direct analogue of width in resolution; the reason we do not refer to it as “width” is that in the
geometric setting of cutting planes, width strongly suggests a geometric interpretation that would be inappropriate.
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ℓ1-bounded coefficients. We will also use a restriction on the magnitude of the (integer) coeffi-
cients. Given a formula of cutting planes, ϕ = [
∑k
i=1 cixi ≥ b], we define the ℓ1-norm of ϕ (denoted
‖ϕ‖1) to be |b| +
∑k
i=1 |ci|, i.e., the ℓ1 norm of the coefficient vector. For L ∈ N, we naturally say
that a cutting planes proof is L-bounded if every ϕ appearing in the proof has ‖ϕ‖1 ≤ L.
We remark that the natural simulation of width-w resolution by cutting planes yields w-sparse
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(−1)xj ≥ 1− |{i : ℓi negative}|


in which, if k ≤ w, the coefficients from the LHS contribute at most w to the ℓ1-norm, and the
threshold is easily seen to contribute at most w (assuming w ≥ 1). So, a simultaneously sparse and
ℓ1-bounded restriction of cutting planes generalizes the width-bounded restriction of resolution.
We furthermore need to know that this special case of cutting planes is restriction-closed—
note that other natural special cases, e.g., bounding the sizes of individual coefficients may not be.
Nevertheless, for the ℓ1-bounded cutting planes, this is easily established:
Proposition 29 The class of L-bounded w-sparse cutting plane proofs is restriction closed for any
L,w ∈ N.
Proof: Let any L-bounded w-sparse cutting plane proof Π and partial assignment ρ be given.
We consider the proof Π|ρ obtained by restricting every step of Π by ρ (shown to be a cutting
planes proof in Proposition 28). Now, we note that in this proof, our encoding of 1 as [0 ≥ −1] is
0-sparse and 1-bounded, so it is guaranteed to be L-bounded and w-sparse. More generally, given
























by the triangle inequality; as furthermore 0 ≤
∑
i:ρi=0
|ci|, we conclude that ‖ϕ|ρ‖1 ≤ ‖ϕ‖1 ≤ L,
so Π|ρ is also L-bounded. Similarly, since every variable appearing in ϕ|ρ appears in ϕ and ϕ
appearing in Π are assumed to be w-sparse, ϕ|ρ appearing in Π|ρ are also w-sparse. Thus, Π|ρ is
also a w-sparse cutting planes proof, as needed.
We now consider Algorithm 5, an analogue of Algorithm 3 – i.e., a simple dynamic programming
algorithm – for the limited decision problem for w-sparse and L-bounded cutting planes.
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Theorem 30 (Analysis of decision algorithm for sparse, bounded cutting planes) For any
w,L ∈ N, Algorithm 5 solves the limited decision problem for w-sparse L-bounded cutting planes.
It runs in time O((w + max{|φi|})L(Ln)
w(L(Ln)w + ℓ)2) (which, for w constant and w-sparse
L-bounded φi is O(L
3(Ln)3w)) where n is the number of variables.
Proof: The analysis is very similar to our previous dynamic programming algorithms for bounded-
width RES(k), Theorem 20. As there, we are inductively guaranteed that at each stage we set T [ψ]
to 1 only when there is a w-sparse L-bounded proof of ψ, and conversely, for every ψ with a w-
sparse L-bounded proof, until T [ψ] is set to 1, on each iteration of the main loop, we set an entry
of T to 1 for some new step of the proof (we noted that weakening could be simulated by repeated
addition of axioms, so we don’t need to consider it explicitly). Thus, if the input target φ has a
w-sparse L-bounded proof, T [φ] would be set to 1 at some point, whereupon the algorithm accepts,
and otherwise since the size of the table is bounded, the algorithm eventually cannot add more
formulas to the table and so rejects. It only remains to consider the running time.





= O(Lw+1) ways of assigning integer
weights of total ℓ1-weight at most L to the w nonzero coefficients and the threshold; therefore,
as there are at most O(nw) distinct choices of up to w variables, there are at most O(Lw+1nw)
possible w-sparse L-bounded cutting plane formulas. At least one is added on each iteration of
the loop, and each iteration considers every pair of such formulas with the ℓ input formulas (for
O((L(Ln)w + ℓ)2) pairs on each iteration), where this sum can be carried out and checked in
O(w+max{|φi|}) arithmetic operations; checking the O(L) possible multiples and divisors for each
of the O(L(Ln)w) formulas in T also takes O(w) arithmetic operations each, so the time for adding
pairs dominates. The claimed running time is now immediate.
Once again, we are in a position to apply Theorem 13, and thus obtain:
Corollary 31 (Implicit learning in sparse bounded cutting planes) Let a list of w-sparse
L-bounded cutting planes formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕℓ and φ be given, and suppose that partial assignments
are drawn from a masking process for an underlying distribution D; suppose further that either
1. There exists some list of cutting planes formulas ψ1, . . . , ψk such that partial assignments from
the masking process are witnessed to satisfy ψ1, . . . , ψk with probability at least (1 − ǫ + γ)
and there is a w-sparse L-bounded cutting planes derivation of φ from ϕ1, . . . , ϕℓ, ψ1, . . . , ψk
or else
2. [ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕℓ ⇒ φ] is at most (1− ǫ− γ)-valid with respect to D for γ > 0.




) (given unit cost
arithmetic operations) that distinguishes these cases with probability 1−δ when given φ, ϕ1, . . . , ϕℓ,





5 The utility of knowledge with imperfect validity
Although our introduction of PAC-Semantics was primarily motivated by our need for a weaker
guarantee that could be feasibly satisfied by inductive learning algorithms, it turns out to provide
a windfall from the standpoint of several other classic issues in artificial intelligence. Several such
examples are discussed by Valiant [50];3 we will dwell on two core, related problems here, the
3Concerning a related, but slightly different framework—there, “unspecified” is taken to be a third value, on par
with “true” and “false,” which may be treated specially in reasoning.
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frame and qualification problems, first discussed by McCarthy and Hayes [39]. The frame problem
essentially concerns the efficient representation of what changes – and what doesn’t – as the result
of an action (stressed in this form by Raphael [44]). The traditional solutions to this problem –
first suggested by Sandewall [48], with a variety of subsequent formalizations including notably,
McCarthy’s circumscription [37, 38] and Reiter’s defaults [45] and “successor state axioms” [46]
– all essentially are (informally) captured by asserting in one way or another that (normally)
“nothing changes unless an action that changes it is taken.” Putting the early methods such as
circumscription and defaults aside (which have their own issues, cf. Hanks and McDermott’s “Yale
shooting problem” [24]), the other approaches make the above assertion explicit, and thus encounter
some form of the qualification problem—that is, it is essentially impossible to assert the full variety
of reasons for and ways in which something could change or fail to change in a real-world situation.
Thus, the successor state axioms (etc.) fully capture a toy domain at best. And yet, such
simplified models have shown to be useful in the design of algorithms for planning—implicitly
in early work such as Fikes and Nilsson’s STRIPS [19], and more explicitly in later work such
as Chapman’s “modal truth criterion” in his work on partial-order planning [9] and as explicit
constraints in planning as propositional satisfiability by Kautz and Selman [26, 27]. Indeed, such
approaches “solve the problem” in the sense that the kinds of plans generated by such systems are
intuitively reasonable and correspond to what is desired.
More to the point, we can take the stance that such assumptions are merely approximations
to the real-world situation that may fail for various unanticipated reasons, and so while the plans
generated on their basis may likewise fail for unanticipated reasons, this does not detract from
the utility of the plans under ordinary circumstances. Indeed, supposing we take a discrete-time
probabilistic (e.g., Markovian) model of the evolution of the world, we might reasonably expect
that if we consider the marginal distribution over successive world states, that formulas such as
the successor state axioms would be (1 − ǫ)-valid with respect to this distribution for some small
(but nonzero) ǫ. Of course, this view of the solutions to the frame problem is not novel to this
work, and it has been expressed since the earliest works on probabilistic models in planning [15, 21].
The point is rather that such examples of what are effectively (1− ǫ)-valid rules arise naturally in
applications, and we claim that just as PAC-Semantics captures the sense in which learned rules
are (approximately) “true,” PAC-Semantics also captures the sense in which these approximate
rules (e.g., as used in planning) are “true.”
6 Directions for future work
A broad possible direction for future work involves the development of algorithms for reasoning
in PAC-Semantics directly, that is, not obtained by applying Theorem 13 to algorithms for the
limited decision problems under the classical (worst-case) semantics of the proof systems. We will
give some concrete suggestions for how this might be pursued below.
6.1 Incorporating explicit learning
One approach concerns the architecture of modern algorithms for deciding satisfiability; a well-
known result due to Beame et al. [5] establishes that these algorithms effectively perform a search
for resolution proofs of unsatisfiability (or, satisfying assignments), and work by Atserias et al. [3]
shows that these algorithms (when they make certain choices at random) are effective for deciding
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bounded-width resolution.
The overall architecture of these modern “SAT-solvers” largely follows that of Zhang et al. [52],
and is based on improvements to DPLL [14, 13] explored earlier in several other works [36, 4, 22].
Roughly speaking, the algorithm makes an arbitrary assignment to an unassigned variable, and then
examines what other variables must be set in order to satisfy the formula; when a contradiction is
entailed by the algorithm’s decision, a new clause is added to the formula (entailed by the existing
clauses) and the search continues on a different setting of the variables. A few simple rules are
used for the task of exploring the consequences of a partial setting of the variables—notably, for
example, unit propagation: whenever all of the literals in a clause are set to false except for one
(unset) variable, that final remaining literal must be set to true if the assignment is to satisfy the
formula.
One possibility for improving the power of such algorithms for reasoning under PAC-Semantics
using examples is that one might wish to use an explicit learning algorithm such as WINNOW [34]
to learn additional (approximately valid) rules for extending partial assignments. If we are using
these algorithms to find resolution refutations, then when a refutation was produced by such a
modified architecture, it would establish that the input formula is only satisfied with some low
probability (depending on the error of the learned rules that were actually invoked during the
algorithm’s run).
Given such a modification, one must then ask: does it actually improve the power of such
algorithms? Work by Pipatsrisawat and Darwiche [43] (related to the above work) has shown
that with appropriate (nondeterministic) guidance in the algorithm’s decisions, such algorithms do
actually find arbitrary (i.e., DAG-like) resolution proofs in a polynomial number of iterations. Yet,
it is still not known whether or not a feasible decision strategy can match this. Nevertheless, their
work (together with the work of Atserias et al. [3]) provides a potential starting point for such an
analysis.
6.1.1 A suggestion for empirical work
Another obvious direction for future work is the development and tuning of real systems for inference
in PAC-Semantics. While the algorithms we have presented here illustrate that such inference can
be theoretically rather efficient and are evocative of how one might approach the design of a real-
world algorithm, the fact is that (1) any off-the-shelf SAT solver can be easily modified to serve this
purpose and (2) SAT solvers have been highly optimized by years of effort. It would be far easier
and more sensible for a group with an existing SAT solver implementation to simply make the
following modification, and see what the results are: along the lines of Algorithm 2, for a sample
of partial assignments {ρ1, . . . , ρm}, the algorithm loops over i = 1, . . . ,m, taking the unmasked
variables in ρi as decisions and checks for satisfiability with respect to the remaining variables.
Counting the fraction of the partial assignments that can be extended to satisfying assignments
then gives a bound on the validity of the input formula. Crucially, in this approach, learned clauses
are shared across samples. Given that there is a common resolution proof across instances (cf.
the connection between SAT solvers and resolution [5]) we would expect this sharing to lead to a
faster running time than simply running the SAT solver as a black box on the formulas obtained
by “plugging in” the partial assignments (although that is another approach).
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6.2 Exploiting limited kinds of masking processes
Another direction for possibly making more sophisticated use of the examples in reasoning under
PAC-Semantics involves restricting the masking processes. In the pursuit of reasoning algorithms,
it might be helpful to consider restrictions that allow some possibility of “extrapolating” from the
values of variables seen on one example to the values of hidden variables in other examples (which
is not possible in general since the masking process is allowed to “see” the example before choosing
which entries to mask). For example, if the masks were chosen independently of the underlying
examples, this might enable such guessing to be useful.
6.3 Relating implicit learning to query-driven explicit learning
A final question that is raised by this work is whether or not it might be possible to extend the
algorithm used in Theorem 13, Algorithm 1, to produce an explicit proof from an explicit set of
formulas that are satisfied with high probability from e.g., algorithms for finding treelike resolution
proofs even when the CNF we need is not perfectly valid. Although this is a somewhat ambitious
goal, if one takes Algorithm 1 as a starting point, the problem is of a similar form to one considered
by Dvir et al. [16]—there, they considered learning decision trees from restrictions of the target
tree. The main catch here is that in contrast to their setting, we are not guaranteed that we find
restrictions of the same underlying proof, even when one is assumed to exist.
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Appendix
A The necessity of computationally feasible witnessing
We now show that it is necessary for our implicit learning problem that any notion of witnessing
we use possess some kind of efficient algorithm. Broadly speaking, we are supposing that we use
some class of “axiom” formulas A such that whenever the collection of axioms {α1, . . . , αk} ⊆ A
satisfy the our candidate witnessing property W (given as a relation over, say, formulas and partial
assignments) under the masking process with probability (1 − ǫ) (guaranteeing that α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αk
is (1 − ǫ)-valid for the underlying distribution D), and there exists a proof Π of the query ϕ in
the limited set S from the set of hypotheses {α1, . . . , αk}, then the algorithm certifies the (1− ǫ)-
validity of the query ϕ under D. Now, in general, we would expect that in any “reasonable” proof
system and class of “simple” proofs S, the hypotheses should have trivial proofs (namely, they can
be asserted immediately) and therefore the efficient algorithm we are seeking should certify the
(1 − ǫ)-validity of any member of A whenever the property W holds for the masking process with
probability (1− ǫ). (We will repeat this argument slightly more formally in Proposition 32 below.)
In summary, this means precisely that for such a collection A, there is an algorithm such
that on input α ∈ A (and δ, γ > 0) and given an oracle for examples, for any distribution over
masked examples given by a masking process applied to a distribution over scenes M(D), with
probability at least 1 − δ the algorithm correctly decides whether Prρ∈M(D)[W (α, ρ)] ≥ 1 − ǫ + γ
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or Prx∈D[α(x) = 0] ≥ ǫ + γ (given that one of these cases holds) in time polynomial in the size
of the domain, 1/γ, log 1/δ, log 1/ǫ, and the size of α. We refer to this algorithm as an efficient
PAC-Certification of W for A, and it serves as a kind of efficient evaluation algorithm for W .
We now restate these observations more formally: any notion of “witnessing” underlying an
implicit learning algorithm in the style of Theorem 13 must be efficiently evaluable on partial
assignments and therefore also verifiable from examples.
Proposition 32 (Witnessing of axioms must be computationally feasible) Let S be a set
of proofs for a proof system such that any explicit hypothesis has a proof in S. Let A be a set of
formulas and W be a property of formulas.
Suppose that there is a probabilistic algorithm running in time polynomial in the number of
variables n, the size of the query and set of hypotheses, 1/γ, and the number of bits of precision
of the parameters ǫ and δ with the following behavior: given a query formula ϕ, ǫ, δ, γ ∈ (0, 1),
query access to example partial assignments from a masking process M over a distribution over
assignments D, and a list of hypothesis formulas H, distinguishes
• queries ϕ such that [H ⇒ ϕ] is not (1− ǫ− γ)-valid under D from
• queries that have a proof in S from H ′ = H ∪A′ for some A′ ⊆ A such that
Pr
ρ∈M(D)
[∀α ∈ A′ W (α, ρ)] ≥ 1− ǫ+ γ.
Then there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that on input α ∈ A and ρ distinguishes
pairs for which W holds from pairs for which there is some x consistent with ρ such that α(x) = 0.
Moreover, for {α1, . . . , αk} and an oracle for examples from some distribution over partial
assignments M(D), we can distinguish
Pr
ρ∈M(D)
[W (α1, ρ) ∧ · · · ∧W (αk, ρ)] ≥ 1− ǫ+ γ
from cases where α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αk is not (1− ǫ− γ)-valid with probability 1− δ in time polynomial in
1/γ, log 1/ǫ, log 1/δ, the size of the domain, and the size of α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αk.
Proof: We will first argue that W has efficient PAC-Certification for A. Following the argument
sketched above, let any α ∈ A and ǫ, δ, γ ∈ (0, 1) be given. We then simply run our hypothetical
algorithm with query α and H empty. We know that this algorithm then runs in time polynomial
in |α|, 1/γ, log 1/δ, and log 1/ǫ. Furthermore, if α is not (1− ǫ− γ)-valid (i.e., Prx∈D[α(x) = 0] ≥
ǫ+ γ), then we know the algorithm must detect this with probability 1− δ. Likewise, if α satisfies
Prρ∈M(D)[W (α, ρ)] ≥ 1 − ǫ + γ, then for A
′ = {α}, there is a proof of α from A′ in S and our
algorithm is guaranteed to recognize that we are in the second case with probability 1− δ. So we
see that the efficient PAC-Certification of W for A is immediate.
Let any partial assignment ρ be given, and consider the family of point distributions Dy for y
consistent with ρ with the masking processM that obscures precisely the entries hidden in ρ. Then
for every such y, the distribution M(Dy) is a point distribution that produces ρ with probability
1. Consider the behavior of the algorithm for efficient PAC-Certification of W for A given access
to such a distribution (which is trivially simulated given ρ) with say ǫ = 1/2, γ = 1/4.
Suppose that ρ is consistent with some y for which α(y) = 0. Then in such a case, Prx∈Dy [α(x) =
0] = 1 ≥ ǫ+γ, so when given examples fromM(Dy) (and hence, when given ρ as every example) the
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algorithm must decide that the second case holds. Now, suppose on the other hand that W (α, ρ)
holds; then since our distribution produces ρ with probability 1, the algorithm must decide the first
case holds. Thus, our modified algorithm is as needed for the first part.
For the second part, we note that running the algorithm from the first part on each example and
each partial assignment from a sample of size O(1/γ2 log 1/δ), and checking whether the fraction
of times W was decided to hold for all k formulas exceeded 1 − ǫ suffices to distinguish the two
cases by the usual concentration bounds.
Our notion of witnessed values is clearly one that suffices for any family of axioms A. By
contrast, we now see that for example, we cannot in general take W to be the collection of pairs
(α, ρ) such that for every x consistent with ρ α(x) = 1 – arguably, the most natural candidate (and
in particular, the notion originally used by Michael [40]) – since this may be NP-complete, e.g., for
3-DNF formulas, and so is presumably not feasible to check. (We remark that our notion actually
coincides with this one in the case of CNF formulas, which is the relevant class of formulas for the
resolution proof system.)
B On the analysis of the algorithm for bounded-space treelike
resolution
We note that we can associate an optimal clause space to a given derivation using the following
recurrence (often used to define the equivalent pebble number of a tree):
Proposition 33 The optimal space derivation for a treelike resolution proof corresponding to a
given tree can be obtained recursively as follows:
• The space of a single node is 1.
• The space of the root of a tree with two subtrees derivable in space s is s+ 1.
• The space of the root of a tree with subtrees derivable in space s > s′ is s.
Proof: We proceed by induction on the structure of the tree, of course, and a proof of a clause
must assert that clause in the final step, so any proof must use one clause’s worth of space (which
is attained for the sources – axioms – of the proof). Furthermore, it is clear that for any node of
a tree, given that the formula holds for the subtrees rooted at that node, the formula continues to
hold: if one subtree requires more space than the other, we can derive the clause labeling the root
of the former tree in space s, and retaining that clause on the backboard, we can carry out the
space s′ derivation for the other subtree on the blackboard utilizing total space s′ + 1 ≤ s. This
derivation is optimal since the proof derives the clauses labeling the roots of both subtrees, and
therefore it requires at least as much space as the derivation of either subtree.
If the subtrees both require space s, then using a derivation similar to the one described above
(for the subtrees in arbitrary order) gives a space s + 1 derivation of the root. To see that this
is optimal, we first note that if the blackboard is ever empty during a resolution proof, we could
eliminate any steps prior to the step with the empty blackboard, and still obtain a legal proof,
so we assume WLOG that the derivation when restricted to either of the subtrees always include
at least one clause. We next note that in any derivation of one of the subtrees, by the induction
hypothesis, there must be some blackboard configuration that contains s clauses. If this occurs
during a derivation of the other subtree in the overall derivation, then the overall derivation uses
at least s+ 1 space. If it does not, then the conclusion of this derivation (the root of the subtree)
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must remain on the blackboard for use in the final step of the proof; therefore, at a configuration of
the blackboard in the derivation of the other subtree with at least s clauses, at least s+ 1 clauses
appear on the blackboard in the overall derivation.
Actually, Anso´tegui et al. [2] refer to the clause space for treelike resolution as the Horton-
Strahler number after the discoverers of the corresponding combinatorial parameter on trees [25,
49] (which again happens to be essentially the same as the “pebble number” of the tree). The
algorithm for efficient proof search – SearchSpace, Algorithm 2 – was, to the best of our knowledge,
first essentially discovered as an algorithm for learning decision trees (of low pebble number) by
Ehrenfeucht and Haussler [17], (we remark that the connection between treelike resolution and
decision trees is an old bit of folklore, first appearing in the literature in a work by Lova´sz et
al. [35]) and rediscovered in the context of resolution by Kullmann [33]; the algorithm used by
Beame and Pitassi [6] is also essentially similar, although they only considered the resulting proof
tree size (not its space).
Although the analysis of SearchSpace is, at its heart, a fairly straightforward recurrence, it
requires some groundwork. We first note that whenever a bounded space treelike resolution proof
exists, it can be converted into a (normal) form that can be discovered by SearchSpace:
Definition 34 (Normal) We will say that a resolution proof is normal if in its corresponding
DAG: 1. All outgoing edges from Cut nodes are directed to Cut nodes. 2. The clauses labeling any
path from the sink to a Cut node contain literals using every variable along the path. 3. A given
variable is used in at most one cut step and at most one weakening step along every path from a
source to a Cut node.
Proposition 35 For any space-s treelike resolution proof Π there is a normal space-s treelike
resolution proof Π′.
Proof: First note that in general, we don’t need to use weakening steps in the proof, except
perhaps on some initial path from a source: all other occurrences can be eliminated by deleting
the introduced literal along the path to the sink until either a node is encountered in which the
other incoming edge is from a clause that also features that literal or which applies the cut rule
on that variable, redirecting the edge on this path to the cut node past it towards the sink in the
latter case (eliminating the other branch of the proof), and then finally replacing the weakening
node with the node leading to it. This transformation does not increase the clause space of a proof
and leaves a treelike proof treelike.
Once the weakening steps have been removed (i.e., in the proof cut nodes only have outgoing
edges to other cut nodes) we can see that on any path from the sink to any cut node, at most one
literal is introduced at each step; in particular, the set of literals on the path leading to any cut
node is a superset of the literals in the cut node. Note that we can obtain a proof of the same
clause space in which the internal nodes are all labeled with the clauses consisting of these sets of
literals, by adding some additional weakening steps between the sources of the proof and the first
cut node. Since these steps leave these chains at clause space 1, the clause space is preserved, and
a treelike proof is still treelike.
Finally, to guarantee the third property, we show how to eliminate additional mentions of a
variable. While the proof is not normal, identify some offending path. For the subtree rooted at
the occurrence of the label closest to the source of this path, replace this subtree with its child
subtree labeled with the same clause (note that one such subtree must exist since this literal is
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already mentioned in the clause). Note that the result is still a treelike resolution proof, and
moreover, since the child subtree has clause space no greater than the clause space of the original
subtree, the clause space of the new proof cannot increase.
We now describe the proof of Theorem 16.
Theorem 36 (SearchSpace finds space-s treelike proofs when they exist) If there is a space-
s treelike proof of a clause C from a CNF formula ϕ, then SearchSpace returns such a proof, and
otherwise it returns “none.” In either case, it runs in time O(|ϕ| · n2(s−1)) where n is the number
of variables.
Proof: Recalling Proposition 33, in any normal space-s treelike derivation of a clause C, one of
the clauses involved in the final step must be derivable in space at most s−1. It therefore clear that
SearchSpace can find any normal space-s treelike proof by tracing paths from the root, choosing a
literal labeling one of the clauses derivable in strictly smaller space first. By Proposition 35, this is
sufficient, and all that remains is to check the running time.
Given W work per each invocation of SearchSpace (i.e., ignoring its recursive calls, so T (n, 1) ≤
W for all n and T (1, s) ≤ W for all s), the running time is described by the recurrence T (n, s) ≤
T (n− 1, s) + 2nT (n− 1, s− 1) +W . We can verify (by induction on n and s) that W (n+ 1)2(s−1)
is a solution. Assuming the bound holds for T (n− 1, s) and T (n− 1, s − 1), (for n > 1, s > 1):





≤W ((n+ 1)2(s−1) −
1
(n+ 1)2
(n+ 1)2(s−1) + 1)
≤W (n+ 1)2(s−1)
Noting that the first case can be checked in time O(|ϕ|) (for O(|ϕ|) work per node) gives the claimed
bound.
We now establish that the bounded-space algorithm efficiently finds treelike proofs; we first
recall the statement of Proposition 18.
Proposition 37 A treelike proof Π can be carried out in clause space at most log2 |Π|+ 1.
Proof: We proceed by induction on the structure of the DAG corresponding to Π. For a proof
consisting of a single node, the claim is trivial. Consider any treelike proof now; one of children of
the root is the root of a subtree containing at most half of the nodes of the tree. By the induction
hypothesis, this derivation can be carried out in space at most log2(|Π|/2) + 1 = log2 |Π|, while the
other child can be derived in space at most log2 |Π| + 1. Therefore, by Proposition 33, there is a
derivation of the root in space at most log2 |Π|+ 1.
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Algorithm 3: Pseudocode for Decide-RES(k)-Width
input : List of k-DNF formulas ϕ1 . . . , ϕℓ, target width-w k-DNF φ, width bound w ∈ N.
output: Accept if there is a RES(k) proof of φ of width w; Reject otherwise.
begin
Initialize a table T [ψ]← 0 for every k-DNF ψ of width at most w and then set T [ϕi]← 1
for each ϕi that is a width-w k-DNF.
NEW ← 1.
while NEW = 1 do
if T [φ] = 1 then
return Accept
NEW ← 0.
foreach k-DNF ψ1 of width at most w with T [ψ1] = 1 or among ϕ1, . . . , ϕℓ do
foreach Formula ψ′ of width at most w derivable from ψ1 by weakening or
∧-elimination do
if T [ψ′] = 0 then
T [ψ′]← 1; NEW ← 1
foreach Formula ψ2 of width at most w with T [ψ2] = 1 or among ϕ1, . . . , ϕℓ do
if The cut rule can be applied to ψ1 and ψ2 yielding a k-DNF ψ
′ of width at
most w then
T [ψ′]← 1; NEW ← 1
foreach j-tuple of distinct k-DNFs (ψ1, . . . , ψj) of width w with T [ψi] = 1 (for
i = 1, . . . , j) with j ≤ k do
if ∧-introduction can be applied to ψ1, . . . , ψj , yielding a width-w k-DNF ψ
′ then
T [ψ′]← 1; NEW ← 1
return Reject
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Algorithm 4: Pseudocode for Decide-deg-d-PC/PCR
input : Degree bound d, list of degree-d polynomials in multilinear monomial representation
p1, . . . , pℓ, target degree-d polynomial in multilinear monomial representation, q.
output: Accept if there is a degree-d polynomial calculus (resp. PCR) derivation of [q = 0];
Reject otherwise.
begin
Initialize B to the empty list.
Initialize S ← {p1, . . . , pℓ} (S also contains the complementarity polynomials x+ x¯− 1
for PCR).
while S 6= ∅ do
Let p be an arbitrary element of S and remove p from S
foreach b ∈ B in decreasing order (while p 6= 0) do
if The leading monomial in b is the leading monomial in p then
p← Gaussian reduction of p by b (i.e., subtract a multiple of b so that the
leading monomials cancel).
if p 6= 0 then
Insert p into B, maintaining the decreasing order of lead monomials.
if p has degree at most d− 1 then
foreach indeterminate α do
Add the multilinearization of αp to S.
foreach b ∈ B in decreasing order (while q 6= 0) do
if The leading monomial in b is the leading monomial in q then
q ← Gaussian reduction of q by b





input : Formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕℓ and φ, sparsity and ℓ1-norm bounds w,L ∈ N.
output: Accept if there is a L-bounded w-sparse proof of φ of from ϕ1, . . . , ϕℓ; else, Reject.
begin
Initialize a table T [ψ]← 0 for every cutting planes formula ψ of sparsity w and
‖ψ‖1 ≤ L; put T [ψ]← 1 for every axiom ψ. if φ an axiom then
return Accept
for i = 1, . . . , ℓ if ϕi is w-sparse do




while NEW = 1 do
NEW ← 0.
foreach Pair of formulas (ψ1, ψ2) in T or among ϕ1, . . . , ϕℓ do
if ψ1 + ψ2 has sparsity at most w, ‖ψ1 + ψ1‖ ≤ L, and T [ψ1 + ψ2] = 0 then
NEW ← 1; T [ψ1 + ψ2]← 1
foreach Formula ψ in T do
for a = −L, . . . , L do
if ‖a · ψ‖1 ≤ L and T [a · ψ] = 0 then
if a · ψ = φ then
return Accept
NEW ← 1; T [a · ψ]← 1
for d = 2, . . . , L do
if d divides ψ and T [ψ divided by d] = 0 then
if ψ divided by d = φ then
return Accept
NEW ← 1; T [ψ divided by d]← 1
return Reject
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